手記__蘇格拉底__成佛之路

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蘇格拉底：成佛之路－－

  無論是誰，都擁有“正確臆見”內在其中，

  通過適當的方法，就能使那種內在的“正確臆見”

  在現實中蘇醒過來。

〈書童：這不就是佛教的開悟！〉

 

蘇格拉底：童奴實驗－－

  沒有學過幾何學的少年，在巧妙提問的引導下，

  正確地掌握了幾何學知識。

〈書童：這不就是佛教的禪宗！〉

 

蘇格拉底：

  靈魂不死！在無窮輪迴中，靈魂已見識過所有事物。所以，靈魂無需學習。

  雖說如此，靈魂的素質可有不同。

  人類所謂的學習，不過是“忘卻該事”的靈魂“再拾回”對該事的認知。

  對靈魂而言，其實並沒有增加（忘卻也不是減少）。

〈書童：這不就是佛教的業力差別，與語言道斷！〉

 

〈書童：

  這裡不是要說：啊～蘇格拉底的思想，與佛教一致！

  我們需要先瞭解蘇格拉底在說些什麼，再看他的這想法，與佛教是否有相同處？

  是“包含於” 佛教？還是“非”包含於？甚至是否有砥觸的地方？

  若是有不一致的地方，那是我沒懂蘇格拉底，還是我沒懂佛法？

  若有不合理的地方，是假設錯誤，推導錯誤，還是分析錯誤？

  如果錯誤更正後，這不合理是否能變化合理？

  我們應該這般思考與學習新的事物。〉

 

 

論《美諾篇》中“回憶說”的認識論背景與特點__林美茂

--  https://www.csust.edu.cn/mksxy/info/1077/1851.htm

作者：林美茂

2015-04-20

 

在柏拉圖哲學中，“回憶說”作為“相論”得以確立的一個重要理論支柱是任何人都不得不承認的事實。 “回憶說”不僅對於“相論”的確立是如此的，在柏拉圖哲學認識論的形成中也是不可缺少的組成部分。 這個學說最初是在初期對話篇《美諾篇》中提出來的。之后，在《斐多篇》中，作為一種完整的學說得以完成。   本文將以《美諾篇》為主要研究對象，分析柏拉圖的“回憶說”是在怎樣的認識論背景下提出來的，究竟是如何進行邏輯性展開的，其作為一種學說要怎樣才能得以理論性確立等問題，以此揭示《美諾篇》的論証背景與論述特點，把握柏拉圖哲學中關於這一學說的思考足跡。

一、從本質的追問到“回憶說”的提出   平時，我們要學習（mathesis）什麼，一般都認為那是自己不知道的東西通過學習而達到了知道的狀態。但是，針對人的這種常識性認識，只要我們進一步思考，就會發現其中存在非常不合理的因素。試想想，如果人對於某種存在完全不知道的話，那麼對於這個人來說，那種東西就與不存在無異，根本不會產生獲得這種東西的欲望，自然就不可能會有探索或者學習這樣的行為產生。比如，沒見過也沒聽說過電腦游戲機的孩子不會纏著父母買﹔沒見過也不知道冰淇凌為何物的孩子不會產生想吃冰淇凌的願望……這些生活中司空見慣的事情，與上述的學習問題道理是一樣的。如果小孩纏著父母要買游戲機，想吃冰淇凌的話，那麼肯定在其提出這種要求之前，即過去的某個時候、以某種方式已經知道了這些東西的存在。只有這樣，在道理上才講得通。   然而，人在學習某種東西的時候，一般情況下都是要學習、探討自己不知道的東西，或者說正是因為不知道才需要學習。可是，不知道的東西究竟該如何探索呢？人要進行探索、研究卻不知道其探索、研究的對象，這是不可能的事情。而話說回來，人如果已經知道了其所要探索的對象，也就沒有再進行任何研究的必要了。就這樣，人無論知道還是不知道其所要學習、探索的對象，學習、探索都是不可能或者不必要的。   柏拉圖在《美諾篇》中提出“回憶說”的根本出發點，就在於駁斥這種有關學習、探索的問題在邏輯上存在的兩難論調（dilemma）。也就是說，柏拉圖通過“回憶說”，揭示了在人的“知道”和“不知道”這兩種認識狀態之間，還存在著“忘卻”的認知狀態，以此克服這一邏輯困境。簡單地說，那就是過去曾經知道了的東西，現在卻忘卻了，那麼，通過學習就可以重新獲得關於那種東西的知識，這就是學習。因此，所謂學習，並不是以完全不知道的東西為對象，而是以過去曾經知道，而現在已經忘卻了的東西為對象。所以，柏拉圖認為：“探索也好、學習也罷，實際上總體說來就是回憶”（《美諾篇》81d）。   柏拉圖提起這樣學說的直接目的，就在於克服上述的關於探索的邏輯兩難論調，但其根本的意圖卻在於揭示蘇格拉底的本質追問（追求真知）的意義。其實，在《美諾篇》中，蘇格拉底和美諾之間所進行的德性問題的討論，是蘇格拉底“本質追問”的最具代表性的例子。   《美諾篇》以“德性究竟是否可教”的問題開始討論的。這一問題，是當時哲學討論的核心問題。《普羅泰格拉篇》就是以這個問題為中心，展開了蘇格拉底和普羅泰格拉之間的激烈辯論。蘇格拉底在把握這個問題的時候，具有他獨特的提出問題的方法。他認為，在質問“德性究竟是否可教”之前，首先必須關注的是“德性是什麼”這一問題。為什麼呢?因為如果連那種東西“是什麼？（hoti estin﹔）”都不知道的話，就不可能知道那是“怎麼樣？（poion ti estin﹔）”的。那麼，討論那種東西“究竟是否可教”的問題根本就是不可能的。   但是，社會上一般在考慮“德性究竟是否可教”這一問題的時候，總是深信自己已經知道了德性是什麼。例如，在《美諾篇》中出現的對話主人公美諾，他對於蘇格拉底的“德性是什麼”的提問，充滿自信地列舉出了男人的德性是什麼、女人的德性是什麼，甚至還有小孩的德性以及老人的德性等等。但是，他自認為知道了的那些有關德性問題的答案，只不過是德性的一部分屬性而已。很明顯是在回答“德性是怎麼樣的”這一屬性，並沒有回答蘇格拉底所要求的“德性是什麼”這一本質。之所以可以這麼說，那是因為男人的德性、女人的德性、小孩的德性以及老人的德性都只是德性的一個實例，換句話說，都只是限定在男性或者女性這一特定領域中的德性形態，即屬於“德性”的某種現象而已。   例如，對於“X是什麼”這一問題，回答“X是p”、“X是q”等等是可以的。但是，p或q都只是在回答X“是怎麼樣”的問題。也就是說，是關於屬性問題的說明，並非對於X本質的回答。為什麼可以這麼說呢？因為如果“X是p”屬於本質的回答，那麼，也可以說“p就是X”，那麼X和p就是等價的、等置的，即X≡p這一完全等式是成立的。但是，如果X≡p這一等式成立，那麼“X是q”，即X等於q就不可能成立。因此，如果可以說“X是p”、還可以說“X是q”……，那麼我們就不得不認為p、q等等都只是關於X的所附帶的屬性說明。而屬性p、q是依存於X才能得以存在的東西。為此，要想認識p、q，就必須知道其所歸屬的X本身是什麼的問題。   比如，對於“肉體是什麼”這一提問，回答那是眼睛或者是手，這樣的回答屬於不正確的回答是一目了然的。因為眼睛、手等只是肉體的一部分、並不是全體肉體的本身。所以，可以說“肉體是像眼睛、像手那樣的東西”、或者“眼睛、手是肉體的一部分”，卻不能說“肉體是眼睛”或者“肉體是手”。上述美諾的回答就與這例子無異。但是，蘇格拉底所要求的回答是：“那些德性（的現象）所具有的一個同樣的形相（eidos）”①究竟是什麼的問題。所謂的蘇格拉底本質的追問，就是尋求內在於諸多現象中共同的形相是什麼的這一問題的質問。不僅德性問題的討論是如此，對於其它所有的知識，蘇格拉底思考問題的根本也都是這樣的②。   但是，蘇格拉底所追求的德性的共有之“形相”，並不是現實這個世界中所表現出來的男人的德性、女人的德性等這些我們在經驗上能夠把握的東西，也就是說不是有關德性的各種實例。對此，美諾陷入了回答的困境（aporia）。那麼，蘇格拉底如果不能克服這種困境，即如果不能証明這樣的“形相”在什麼地方存在著，而我們使用某種方法能夠對其進行探索、研究的話，既不能說服以美諾為代表的對於探索的懷疑者們，其所進行的本質的追求也就失去了理論基礎。“回憶說”就是為了解決這些難題而被提出來的一種學說。   前面說過，根據“回憶說”的觀點，所謂學習就是回憶。這一認識體現了蘇格拉底對於世間一般所理解的“教育”、“學習”是具有批判性的思想。蘇格拉底強調，教育者不可能給予被教育者知識，教育者充其量只是幫助被教育者通過自己的力量，重新使自己內在於靈魂的知識回憶起來。所謂“接生術”③就是立足於這種思想的。蘇格拉底針對當時社會上人們對於學習的看法，多以諷刺或者調侃的表現予以批判，這種敘述在柏拉圖的對話篇中隨處可見④。   “回憶說”就是以上述知的追求為背景，出現在柏拉圖哲學從初期到中期過渡時期的對話篇中。那麼，在柏拉圖哲學中，“回憶說”究竟是如何得到理論性展開的呢？在這裡筆者通過其所涉及到的兩個主要對話篇，即《美諾篇》和《斐多篇》，探討柏拉圖思考的軌跡，把握“回憶說”得以確立的理論依據。

二、“回憶說”要得以確立的基本條件   所謂“回憶（anamnesis）”,顧名思義就是“回想起來”的意思。柏拉圖把它定義為“自己自身再次掌握知識”⑤。對於這種自身再次掌握（analambano）自己內在知識之回憶，在中期對話篇的《斐多篇》中，柏拉圖作了以下兩種界定。 1）人在被提問的時候，如果那種提問的方法巧妙，    那麼被問的那人，對於所有的事情的真實情況，都可以自己進行描述（73a）。 2）我們說，人在看、聽、或用其他感覺來捕捉別的什麼東西的時候，    如果不僅只認知（gnoi）(訴諸於感覺的)那個東西，    與那個知識不同的、別的知識也成為其認知的對象，在想象中對其進行描繪的話，    那麼，他就是回憶起了那個東西（73c）。   在上述的兩個界定中，顯示了“回憶說”成立的三個前提（必須）條件。 （1）知識內在的必要性。 這個問題無論在《美諾篇》、還是在《斐多篇》，柏拉圖都作了反復的強調和論証。 在《美諾篇》中，蘇格拉底對美諾帶來的童奴進行測驗，以此証明作為人無論是誰，都有“正確的臆見（orthe doxa）”內在其中。但是，人類究竟是在何時、何地、如何獲得到這種臆見的呢？又是何時何地喪失的呢(為此，處於現在必須對其回憶)？這些疑問都成為問題。為了論証這些問題，關於靈魂不死的探討就不可避免。   讀過柏拉圖哲學的人都知道，《斐多篇》有一個副標題：“關於靈魂”。 在這個對話篇中，圍繞靈魂不死的問題展開了蘇格拉底行刑前的最后一場精彩的討論。   《美諾篇》是以“德性”問題為討論的中心，但是，在“回憶說”理論提出之際，人在此生以前，就必須以某種形式知道了其回憶的對象。為此，這種理論的成立，就必須以認知主體之靈魂在此生之前已經存在著為前提才說得通。不過，在《美諾篇》中，柏拉圖只提到了靈魂是不死的，在其每一次輪回的過程中獲得了所有的知識，把這個問題的敘述以這種故事性、神秘性的形式敷衍了事。只有到了《斐多篇》才對靈魂為什麼是先在的、是不死的問題展開應有的邏輯論証。   總之，“回憶說”的理論要得以確立，靈魂的先在、以及不死都是不可或缺的前提條件。 “先在”可以為靈魂獲得那種內在知識提供邏輯上的時間性依據。 而只有“不死”才能為靈魂具備有關所有事物的知識提供可能的條件。   （2）人的那種內在的知識究竟是怎樣的知識必須界定。 還有，為什麼可以說那種知識是必然存在的問題也應該在邏輯上予以論証。 在《美諾篇》中，這種內在的知識被稱為“正確的臆見（orthe doxa）”⑥，與此相對，在《斐多篇》中，柏拉圖卻稱之為“正確的邏格斯（orthe logos）”⑦。在希臘語中“臆見”與“邏格斯”是不能混淆的概念。   “臆見”的原意為“主觀的想法、考慮、判斷”，由此引申出“推測、臆斷”等意思而被使用。由於“臆見”也是一種人的判斷，所以必然包含著“正確（真，orthos）”和“錯誤(偽，pseudes)”的兩種可能性。在柏拉圖哲學中，不用說“臆見”本身不可能是“知識（episteme）”，即使是”正確臆見”，也不是“知識”，必須與“知識”嚴格區別開來的。那是因為柏拉圖認為，所謂”正確臆見”那只是人的某種“臆見”偶然地擁有正確的結果而已，其所擁有的正確性的結果並沒有穩定性的保障。就是說，“正確臆見”中不具備其達到正確結果的依據說明（aitias logismos）⑧。   但是，“邏格斯”則不同，常常是指稱基於客觀性的思考、推理、原理等的語言。“邏格斯”是達到把握知識的方法，也是知識形成的根本基礎。當然《斐多篇》中所謂的“正確的邏格斯”，可能與蘇格拉底所提倡的具有積極的、指向真知意義上的“邏格斯”⑨有所不同，如果是相同的，那就沒有必要對“邏格斯”以“正確的”這一形容詞來限定。因此，這裡所謂的“正確邏格斯”只是“正確的說明”的含義，與《美諾篇》中所說的“正確臆見”在本質上並沒有區別。這種“正確臆見”也好，“正確邏格斯”也好，只有經過嚴密的邏輯論証，始終保持其不可改變的正確性的前提下，才能承認它是知識。   總之，不管是《美諾篇》，還是《斐多篇》，雖然其中所論述的回憶的程序有所不同，但兩者都是以與真正意義上的知識不同的“內在的知識”、即“正確臆見”、或者“正確邏格斯”為前提的。在《美諾篇》中，把這種認識比喻成可以通過提問使之清醒，並逐漸發展成為現實中真正知識的一種“夢”的狀態⑩。   （3）要促成、或者說使人引起“回憶”的狀況必須有以下兩種類型。 （A）在受到某種好（巧妙）的提問的時候，人將被那種提問所引導，內在於其靈魂中的正確臆見就會像從夢中蘇醒那樣被喚醒(11)。也就是說，由於被他人提問而產生回憶。   （B）人在看、聽、或者通過各種各樣的感覺器官來捕捉某種事物的時候，其在認知（面前的）那個事物的同時，與那個事物的知識相關的其它知識的對象也會（在腦海中）浮現(12)。也就是說，人可以通過自己積累的感覺經驗引起、產生回憶。   人在產生回憶時的上述兩種狀況，乍一看會覺得不太一樣，但實際上可以看出其共同的特點。那就是不管引起回憶的狀況是如何的不同，回憶始終是回憶者本身，不可能是他者的行為。也就是說，回憶來自於自己自身的行為這一點是相同的。當然，根據個人、或者事態的不同，使人達到重新擁有（把握）知的狀態的回憶過程或快或慢，回憶的能力存在著個別性差異。   根據柏拉圖的理解，這是由於靈魂在前世學習、觀照本真的過程中存在著差別，從而導致靈魂素質不同的結果而致。也就是說，柏拉圖把這種能力的差異完全歸結到靈魂的素質（physis）。   〈書童：佛教的業力差別〉   關於靈魂素質的優劣，在對話篇《斐德羅篇》中，柏拉圖以神話敘述的方式描繪了靈魂素質的起源。簡單地說，那就是與神同在的靈魂們，在與眾神一起前往天球之外觀照那裡的本真（真實）世界的時候，根據靈魂平時努力的不同而產生的本質之優劣，有的靈魂能夠長時間地觀看本真世界，有的靈魂卻只能觀看一點點時間，而有的靈魂甚至只能夠看上一眼(13)。不過，對於靈魂問題的這種敘述方法只是一種神話式、虛構性的說明，在邏格斯的世界中，由於這樣的說明不擁有絲毫的邏輯自恰性，也就不具備任何的說服力。但是，筆者在這裡卻明知故犯地以這種敘述為論據，那是因為筆者認為，我們至少可以從柏拉圖這種說明中領會到，他是如何理解靈魂素質不同的起源這個問題。   在這一個對話篇中，柏拉圖把人類的靈魂分為九個等級(14)，這種認識也是研究柏拉圖哲學的一個不可忽視的問題。

三、《美諾篇》中“回憶說”的提出和展開   《美諾篇》中提出“回憶說”，是以針對下述美諾的質疑，蘇格拉底對此論調進行反駁性的回答開始的。   嗨！蘇格拉底！如果你完全不知道那是什麼，那你究竟打算如何對那種對象進行探索呢？ 也就是說，在你完全不知道的事物當中，究竟該以什麼事物來確立自己的目標，然后對其進行探索呢？即使你很幸運，探索過程中找到了那個對象，你憑什麼可以知道那就是自己要探索的那種存在呢？—-因為你本來就不知道那究竟是什麼嘛！（80d5）   美諾的疑問，代表著在當時的希臘社會，存在著那種不追求真知，只以駁倒對方為目的的智者（歷史上曾被成為詭辯家）們所熱衷的一種立論方式（這種辯論，潛在著一種不可知論的觀點，以及把雄辯者當作“智者”的社會背景）。在此，蘇格拉底針對美諾的論調，指出了這種立論的根本邏輯所在。   無論是自己知道的東西，還是不知道的東西，人都是不能進行探索的。 也就是說，首先，不會有人探索已經知道的東西吧。為什麼呢？因為既然已經知道了，也就沒有讓人探索的必要。其次，可以說也不會有人會想探索不知道的東西吧。為什麼呢?因為在這種情況下，自己應該探索什麼也是不知道的（80e）。   這種觀點，乍一看似乎是十分合乎邏輯的。那是因為，我們總認為對於某種事物，要麼“知道”要麼“不知道”，只有其中的一種情況存在。除此之外，就不可能有其它的可能性。而這兩種情況不管是處於哪一種，按照上述邏輯都不可能進行探索，那麼，關於人的探索本身的可能性就不可能存在了。正因為如此，從形式上來看，美諾的觀點是一個相對完整的推論。但是，究竟能不能說這是一個嚴密的推論呢？還是一個必須深入思考的問題。那是因為，在我們現實生活中是否存在著認知的真空狀態的問題是值得懷疑的。而即使說“知道”了，那麼，那種所謂的“知”是否是完全無誤的呢，這也是值得斟酌的。   當然，上述的立論並不會這麼簡單就能夠駁倒的。要消除被這種持論所迷惑的人們所面對的認識困境，也就是說，為了對深信自己已經知道了，所以不需要探索的人，指出其所擁有的知是否屬於真知還有進行推敲、檢驗的必要﹔對於認定不知道的事物無法進行探索，從而放棄探索的人，為其提供探索可能性的理論依據。在這裡柏拉圖必須把“回憶”，這樣一種作為人誰都有經歷過的認識現象，放在哲學方法的基礎上進行揭示與把握必要了。   美諾的立論方法在邏輯學上屬於“兩難（dinemma,雙刃論法）”的典型例子。那就是，因為人的認識狀態要麼知道要麼不知道。如果知道的話，就沒有必要進一步探索﹔如果不知道的話，也就無法探索。所以，無論知道還是不知道人都不會（不必要）探索。   但是，只要分析一下這種立論的“雙刃”，我們就會發現“雙刃”之間存在著一條可以穿過其中的通道。因為在人的認識中，除了“知道”與“不知道”之外，還有一種很容易被人們忽略的認知狀態，那就是“忘卻”的狀態。就是說，對於某某事物本來已經知道了，卻由於某種原因把其忘卻了。人處於這種認識狀態，就似乎與不知道的狀態是一樣的。但是，這種認知狀態不能和不知道的狀態混淆起來。因為這種狀態，只要有某種契機就能夠再次恢復認識的。而完全的不知道（無知），即知的真空狀態是不可能做到這一點的。   “過去擁有，但是喪失了”，這樣一種知的忘卻狀態，並不是完全的無知，只是處於一種讓過去所知道的東西沉入到記憶的大海深處的狀態而已。正因為如此，蘇格拉底在這裡把所謂的不知道的狀態改稱為“還沒有想不起來（me memnemenos）”的狀態(15)。換一句話說，蘇格拉底能夠這樣改變他的表現方式，完全是以這種認識為前提的。   柏拉圖為了反駁上述的關於否定人的探索可能性的持論，就在人的“忘卻現象”中喚醒人們的注意力。也就是說，他提醒人們關注，在“知道”與“不知道”之間，還存在著“忘卻”這一認知狀態。也許，他自己也是由於對於這一容易被人們忽略的認知狀態的發現，從而開始在哲學上論証“回憶”這一認識現象的。   就這樣，既然承認在知與不知之間存在著忘卻的狀態，也就是說，承認人的認識中存在著一種通過提問，能夠在現實中作為知而蘇醒的臆見的狀態。那麼，即使是屬於所謂的“不知道”的狀態，也不能斷定說那就是“無知”。倒不如說，既然能把某個事物作為問題提出，因為對於那個事物已經付諸了自己的關心，所以就不能說是完全不知道的。正因為如此，蘇格拉底說：“在不知道事物的人當中，不管其所不知道的是什麼，而他對於自己所不知道的那個事物，都會有正確的臆見內在其中的”。（《美諾篇》85c）   那麼，究竟憑什麼可以說，無論是誰對於其不知道的事物，都會有相關的知識內在其中的呢？對此，柏拉圖必須拿出能夠說服美諾的論據。在《美諾篇》中，這個論據的提供是通過當場的實驗得以進行。   為了証明無論是誰，知識都是內在其中的，蘇格拉底就用美諾帶來的童奴做了現場的回憶實驗。 實驗的內容是通過美諾的家中出生的童奴來論証這個孩子靈魂中擁有幾何學知識。   蘇格拉底在實驗開始之前，首先確認了這個少年從來沒有學過幾何學。然而他在蘇格拉底巧妙的提問的引導下，自己學習掌握了幾何學知識。那就是他正確地回答了面積為邊長2普斯正方形兩倍的正方形，是以邊長2普斯正方形的對角線為邊長的正方形(16)。   讀過這個對話篇大家不難發現，整個實驗是蘇格拉底在地上邊畫圖邊引導進行的， 這個實驗的全過程可分為兩個階段，   第一階段主要讓童奴注意到他各種想法的錯誤，從而排除那些原有的臆見。   第二階段是不斷提供與正確答案相關的暗示，由此引導童奴自己找到正確的答案。   在這個實驗的過程中，主要有以下三點必須引起我們的注意。 （1）以幾何學為例進行實驗。在知識中，再沒有像數學這樣簡潔明了的知識了。對於1加2等於3是沒有人懷疑的。對於實驗中出現的4普斯的正方形的兩倍是8普斯，這也是誰都不得不承認的。美諾質問中談到：“即使你很幸運，探索過程中找到了那個對象，你憑什麼可以知道那就是自己要探索的那種存在呢？”這一種擔心，在這樣數學的例子中是很容易消除的。柏拉圖特別鐘愛幾何學，傳說他在阿卡德摩學園的門口豎立一塊牌子，上面寫著：“不知道幾何學者不得入內”。而在《理想國》中談到相問題的時候，他使用了線段的比喻。在這個比喻中，數學知識被置放在可知界，與可視界的事物區別開來。這些事例充分體現了在柏拉圖看來，數學知識是比其它感覺性事物的知識具有更為確定性的存在。   （2）提問的善導性與巧妙性，然而答案是由被問者自己想出來的。在童奴陷入回答困境的時候，如果蘇格拉底沒有為他畫出輔助線，不改變提問方法，那麼，那孩子恐怕就不能自己找出正確答案。雖然給出答案的終究還是回答者本身，但是要讓回答者自己獨立找到答案，或者提問如果不夠巧妙，那麼，要使回答者達到可以解答的程度，將會需要更多的時間和能力。可以說，這些都說明了提問者高明引導的重要性。與此同時，也說明了要達到正確的回憶，有時僅憑個人的力量是不行的。   （3）因為被提問的童奴，在那之前從來沒有受過任何教育，所以對於幾何學是一無所知的。但是，他卻能夠自己找到幾何學的正確答案。那麼，理所當然這就成為任何人都有“正確臆見”內在其中的有力証據。當然，僅憑這些還不能使“回憶說”達到完整的論証。那是因為，那孩子出生之后，盡管從來沒有受過教育，卻有“正確臆見”內在其中。那麼，其內在“正確臆見”究竟是什麼時候獲得的呢？這一問題還沒有在理論上得到解決。為此，蘇格拉底就進一步指出這種問題的所在：“這個孩子所擁有的各種各樣的臆見，如果不是在此生獲得的話……那就是在此生之外的其它什麼時候，就已經擁有了這些，學習了這些”。（《美諾篇》86a）      所謂“此生之外的其它什麼時候”，我們只能考慮那是在靈魂進入人的肉體之前，也就是在這個孩子“作為人還沒有出生的時候”獲得了這些內在的東西。至此，我們自然就可以得到一個這樣的結論，那就是靈魂的先在（先於肉體而存在）的問題在邏輯上是必然（成立）的。      蘇格拉底的這種回憶實驗的邏輯論証，具有神話式描述（mythos）所不可能達到的說服力，這就是邏格斯（logos）所特有的理論效果。

四、“回憶說”中“先在”和“不死”的問題   一般我們都認為，如果是“先在”的，就意味著是“不死”的。靈魂的“先在”問題就是包含在“不死”的概念之中。也就是說，如果一方成立，另一方也必定是成立的。但是，在邏輯上，“先在”與“不死”是不同的。   關於這個問題，以具體的例子提出質疑的是《斐多篇》中的克貝斯。在《斐多篇》中首先記載了當時人們對於靈魂歸宿的不安心情。那就是人們認為，靈魂脫離死人肉體的同時，就會像氣息、煙霧一樣隨風飄散、消失得無影無蹤(17)。而具體的是克貝斯以織布師和衣服關系的比喻向蘇格拉底的先在論証提出質疑(18)。   這些內容，體現了當時的人們除了要求對靈魂的先在性問題進行論証之外，還要求進一步論証靈魂在肉體死后仍然存在的不死不滅性問題。也就是說，當時的人們並不把“先在”和“不死”作為同樣的意義來理解。這就意味著，對希臘人來說，即使靈魂“先在”，也不能因此就可以說靈魂是“不死”的。那是因為，靈魂在無數次寄居於人的肉體進行輪回之后，沒有任何東西可以保証它不會與最后的肉體一起消失滅亡的。換句話說，靈魂即使是“先在”的，也未必會永遠持續存在著。但是，如果是“不死”的話，那麼“先在”就是理所當然的了，因為“先在”是包含在“不死”之中的。   那麼，如果就這樣只証明靈魂的“先在”，不証明靈魂的“不死”，靈魂在進入肉體之前“見過所有的事物”這一論斷就不能成立了。固然靈魂的“先在”可以為人作為人而存在之前已經獲得了知識問題提供邏輯上的可能性，但是，卻不能說靈魂獲得了所有的知識，因為如果不証明靈魂是不死的話，這個疑問永遠存在。   當然，關於這一點柏拉圖不可能意識不到的。為此，柏拉圖在對話篇中，不得不結論性地表明了自己的承認靈魂不死的主張：“因為靈魂是不死的東西，是經過無數次輪回轉世而來的東西，並且不管是這個世間的事物還是冥界的事物，所有的一切事物它都觀看過了，所以說，靈魂還沒有學到的東西是一件都不會有的。”（《美諾篇》81c）   在《美諾篇》中的“回憶說”問題論述之前，柏拉圖以神職人員或者詩人的証詞為依據，敘述了自己的靈魂觀。但是，這裡所提供的魂不死的思想，並不具備邏輯上自恰性的任何論証。因為神職人員或者詩人的証詞是沒有任何理論根據的，也就是說，屬於神話式、虛構性想象的產物,那只是一種主觀的信仰而已，並沒有獲得那種基於理性精神的哲學思考之絕對的客觀性。   盡管如此，蘇格拉底還是評價其為“真實的、美麗的故事”(19)。這意味著什麼呢？學術界一般認為：“回憶說”理論要得以成立，靈魂不死的問題是一個基本條件。如果靈魂不是不死的存在，那麼“回憶”這一現象就失去了其根源性的依據。但是，在《美諾篇》中，“不知道的東西”是否可以探索﹔怎樣做才可以探索的問題是其討論的中心問題。作為証明這種探索之可能性以及如何探索的手段，柏拉圖提出了回憶的現象來進行論証。因此，在此只要能把討論的焦點集結在關於“學習、探索就是回憶”的邏輯闡明這一問題之上，就達到了目的。   也就是說，這裡“回憶”實驗的目的只是為了証明：無論是誰，對於任何事物，都擁有“正確臆見”內在其中，通過適當的方法，就能使那種內在的“正確臆見”在現實中蘇醒過來。只要能夠通過實証來証明這一立論，從而讓美諾承認任何事物都有探索的可能性就足夠了。此時，作為“回憶說”前提的靈魂不死的思想，只是其主題以外的問題而被置放在論証之外。為此，在論述的展開過程中，關於這個問題只停留在簡單的引用當時社會上人們所熟悉的神職人員和詩人們的思想作為論據。然而筆者認為，除了上述原因之外，還有一個更重要的原因潛在其中。其實在寫作《美諾篇》階段的柏拉圖，關於靈魂不死的問題之所以沒有給予邏輯上的理論展開，主要是因為其自身對於靈魂不死的問題還沒有確切的充分的理論自信而致。   其實，關於靈魂不死的問題究竟在什麼時候讓柏拉圖獲得充分的自信我們並不十分清楚，而學術界對於這個問題的專門研究論著並不多見。但是，西方學術界對於這一問題的看法基本存在兩種傾向。   一部分學者認為，蘇格拉底對於靈魂的存在已經有明確的認識，所以才會反復強調“關心靈魂”的呼吁。比如，美國學者馬克•L•馬可菲冉認為，對於蘇格拉底來說，靈魂（psuche）是道德的判斷、選擇、行為的主體，在《申辯篇》（40c-41b）、《克裡托篇》(54b-c)等對話篇中，已經明顯體現出其高於肉體的存在性認識(20)。   然而，另一部分學者卻反對這種看法，認為初期對話篇出現的靈魂，雖然擁有高於肉體的特性，但是，那裡所強調的只是活著的人的意識和理性，靈魂與這些作用的關系比較模糊，具有與身體不可分離完全的因素。英國古典學者康福德在《從宗教到哲學》中指出：柏拉圖在蘇格拉底死后數年，由於到了南意大利接觸了畢泰戈拉斯教團，從而認識到蘇格拉底所追求的“形相”並不是非實體的亡靈，而是具有實質性存在意義的靈魂，實現了他對於神秘主義的歸依(21)。這個觀點說明了，柏拉圖最初無法理解蘇格拉底的追求（因為蘇格拉底自身也不明確），只有接受了新的靈魂觀之后，才重新對蘇格拉底的追求產生共鳴。   筆者認為康福德的看法更具有說服力。其實，馬克•L•馬可菲蘭的觀點，混淆了蘇格拉底與柏拉圖的區別。他所列舉的《申辯篇》、《克裡托篇》的相關敘述，只要細讀就不難發現，在那裡蘇格拉底所表達的思想，並沒有靈魂死后一定會存在的自信，所以蘇格拉底對於死亡的認識才會出現要麼是永遠的睡眠，要麼是靈魂的遷居這樣的選擇性表現。西方的一部分蘇格拉底研究者，對於蘇格拉底的研究存在著一個共同的誤區，那就是把柏拉圖哲學中的對話主人公蘇格拉底當著蘇格拉底來把握，忘記了那只是柏拉圖、色諾芬、阿裡斯托芬筆下的蘇格拉底，如何從哲學思想的角度分析、區分出柏拉圖與蘇格拉底不同的問題總是被回避。之所以筆者接受康福德的觀點，是因為在柏拉圖的初期對話篇中，蘇格拉底對於靈魂問題的發言總是很曖昧的，缺乏自信的（正因為如此，初期對話篇中，“相”與“感覺事物”的關系也是內在與離在模糊不清的）(22)。   《美諾篇》中的下面一段話可以為我們提供論據。 關於其它各種各樣的問題，為了這一學說，我並不想以充分的自信予以斷言。但是，人在面對不知道某種事物的時候，與其認為不知道的事物既不能發現，也不應該探索﹔倒不如說認為一定要探索的這一想法，能夠使我們成為更為優秀的存在，更加富有勇氣，懈怠之心變得更少。關於這一點，如果我能做到的話，那麼不管是在語言上還是在實際行動上，我都會想非常強硬地堅持這樣的主張。（86b-c）   蘇格拉底的這段話，已經充分表明了當時的柏拉圖的心境。“這一學說”指的是靈魂不死的故事、以及與此相關的“回憶”之可能性的依據問題。所謂“其它各種各樣的問題”是指圍繞靈魂的各種各樣的問題，比如，靈魂的本質、屬性、功能等問題。而“為了這一學說，我並不想以充分的自信予以斷言”等，在這裡很清楚是在表明，正因為蘇格拉底對於靈魂的存在並不具有十分清晰的認識，在柏拉圖哲學的初期階段，即所謂的“蘇格拉底式對話篇”的寫作時期，柏拉圖深受蘇格拉底的影響，對於靈魂的存在問題也無法做出明確斷言的自信。   由於這些原因，在此時提出的“回憶說”，與其進一步詳細說明、展開關於與這個學說相關的靈魂問題的討論，倒不如把重點放在其目的之上。那就是蘇格拉底論証“回憶”的目的，是向人們揭示關於對不知道的事物，也就是根據感覺經驗無法獲得的、即先天存在的認識的可能性，給予人們以探索的勇氣、並激發、鼓舞人們的探索熱情。那就是以此賦予人們以下的希望：如果能夠毫不懈怠地堅持探索，無論對於什麼都可以通過回憶，重新掌握那些曾經擁有過的知識。

五、《美諾篇》中“回憶說”的特點及其存在的問題   通過上述幾節的分析，可以說“回憶說”在《美諾篇》中的論述特點以及存在的問題已經得到了比較明確的展現。   對於柏拉圖來說，與社會上所謂的“知識”其作為知識的資格需要嚴密的推敲、檢驗的問題並列，闡明不知道的事物也擁有探索、研究可能性的問題是《美諾篇》的根本著眼點。   也就是說，“不知道”這種情況，並不是處在與知識完全隔絕的狀態，而是以“臆見”的形式潛藏於人的意識之中。把它作為“還沒有想起來的狀態”、即其作為現實中的知識還沒有得到蘇醒的狀態，通過對於這種狀態的存在論証，從而達到使這種立論得以成立的目的。   在這裡的有關“回憶”問題的論述，其作為一種完整的學說還沒有完成。那是因為，在這個對話篇中，具有明確的邏輯論証的只有那個通過童奴所做的回憶實驗的內容而已。而這個實驗的結果所能提供的論據，僅僅只停留在証明了無論是誰都有“正確臆見”內在其中﹔無論是誰都能夠通過回憶重新把握知識這樣一種結論的層面。對於前面歸納過的“回憶說”要得以確立，必須具備的三個前提條件，其中除去第二個條件之外，第一和第三條件從以下的理由來看都是不完善的。   首先，靈魂的先在和不死這一條件，《美諾篇》的實驗只在理論上証明了一半。關於“先在”，出生之后雖然沒有受過任何教育，卻可以自己想出正確答案的那個童奴，承認他在出生之前就已獲得了那種知識，這在理論上是成立的。但是，我們不能以這樣的“先在”結論，作為靈魂是“不死”的邏輯保障。而如果沒有靈魂是不死的這個前提，那麼“因為……所有的一切事物它都觀看過了，所以說，靈魂還沒有學到的東西是一件都不會有的”這一立論就不成立。也就是說，關於所有的事情的“正確臆見”都是內在的立論就得不到保障。當然柏拉圖也注意到這個問題，正因為如此，他在提出“回憶說”之前就先談到“靈魂是不死的存在”(23)。但是，我們不能把在神話、故事的土壤中栽培出來的花草，原原本本地移植到邏輯、理性的田園中去。因為神官和詩人們的証言不需要客觀的妥當性，那是主觀想象的產物，所以其本質上缺少哲學所追求的邏輯的自恰性內涵。   其次，回憶說的第三個條件，也就是在什麼情況下引起回憶，即回憶所必須具備的條件問題，在這裡的敘述也是不完整的。《美諾篇》中只談到了“提問所引起的回憶”這一種類型。“回憶說”中這一種類型是與所謂的蘇格拉底的“接生術”問題相對應的。關於“接生術”，前面已經提到過，在這裡有必要稍做詳細一點的說明，以便明確兩者之間的關聯性。   “接生術”問題主要在《泰亞泰德篇》中作了詳細的敘述。 在這裡蘇格拉底把自己與人問答的方法以“接生術”來比喻。   接生婆一般都是上了年紀的女性。也就是說，她一定經驗豐富然而自己已經不再懷孕生子了。接生婆的工作首先是識別女性是否懷孕。然后就是對孕婦投藥、念咒來激發陣痛。而根據需要對於有的孕婦減輕其陣痛，幫助難產的孕婦能夠順產，對於未成熟的嬰兒幫助流產等等。在有些時候還幫助辨別“怎樣的女人與怎樣的男人結合可以生出最好的孩子”而充當“結婚的媒人”。   但是，對於接生婆來說其“最大最美”的工作就是判別孕婦生下來的孩子究竟是否健全（真偽）的問題。如果是健全的嬰兒就養育，不健全的嬰兒就遺棄（這種事情在今天的社會是犯罪，而在當時據說遺棄不健全虛弱嬰兒的風俗在社會上很普遍）。   蘇格拉底首先把接生婆的工作與自己的“問答法（dialektike）”相對應，以此說明自己所採用的這種方法的性質特點。與世間接生婆不同的是“問答法”不是幫助女性，而是為了男性的“精神助產”。所謂“精神助產”，指的是識別男性們靈魂中“美好的東西”（在《美諾篇》中被稱作”正確臆見”），通過蘇格拉底“提問”的幫助，男人們自己把這種內在之“美好的東西”在太陽光下生出來。   而蘇格拉底與接生婆一樣，因為自己是“不能生出智慧的人”，所以從不提供自己的答案。他只是一味地“提問”，對於想生的男人通過質問識別其靈魂中究竟是否懷有“靈魂的嬰兒”，然后通過進一步質問激發“陣痛”，或者緩和“陣痛”。最后通過檢驗其“回答”來判別生下來的“嬰兒”健全與否，真偽如何？如果“回答”與正確的邏格斯不相符，那麼只有下狠心讓“嬰兒”與“母親”分開，只承認正確的“回答”。   這種被比喻成“接生術”的蘇格拉底的問答法，在《理想國》第六卷中被作為最大的學問，探索、發現真理的唯一方法置於柏拉圖哲學的中心地位。   從上述內容可以看出，“接生術”與“回憶說”的結構基本是相同的。兩者的關聯性對應圖示如下   不過在此，我們必須明確，對於這種關聯，與其認為“回憶說”和“問答法”同出一轍，倒不如說通過“回憶說”揭示了作為探索真知唯一方法之“問答法”其探索真知的可能性。   通過這種方法，人類內在的“正確臆見”，“雖然是像夢一樣，還處在（再次）剛剛被喚醒的狀態。但是只要有誰，對於與這同樣的事情，多次以各種各樣的方法詢問，其最終這個孩子對於這樣的事情就會擁有不輸給任何人的正確知識”(24)。   在此，必須注意的是柏拉圖使用了“被喚醒（kekinentai）的狀態”這一被動式的表現方式。人從夢中蘇醒一般是自己的力量所致，但在這裡使用的是被動表現，說明了這種“醒”是需要外部條件的。如果沒有被“提問”，那種內在的“正確臆見”可能永遠會處於睡眠的狀態。因此，在這裡論述的“回憶”問題中，雖然自己的“懷孕”，“正確想法”這一“靈魂的嬰兒”的內在，與自己“生出來”（回憶起來）這些事情都是以“自己”作為最基本的前提，但是，為了讓這“嬰兒”平安地“生出來”（回憶起來），絕不能忽視“助產”這一“提問”的作用。也就是，自己之所以能夠從自身當中再次獲取知識，在某種程度上可以說是被提問的結果。或者可以認為這裡所論述的“回憶”是由於提問導致的結果。   在《斐多篇》中我們可以找到關於這一點的確認性敘述：“人在被提問的時候，如果那提問的方法得當的話，被提問的那人對於所有的事物，自己自身都能說出其真實的情況”（73a6-8）。   《斐多篇》的上述這段話就是在確認《美諾篇》中回憶的實驗內容。很明確，在這段話裡“提問方法”得當、巧妙與否是十分重要的，是引導被問者“自己自身說出”這一結果不可或缺的條件。如此強調提問者的作用，表明了要回憶，有時他者（如果素質高、思維能力強的人，這種“他者”也可以是另一個自己。為了簡化論述，在這裡只以“他者”來表現）的存在是極其重要的因素。   其實，如此重視“提問”作用的理由，來自於《美諾篇》中論証“回憶”所擁有的目的。 《美諾篇》的討論重點是對於“不知道的事物是否可教”這一命題的証明。為了証明這個命題成立，蘇格拉底利用童奴做實驗。按美諾所說，這個少年從來沒有受過任何教育。當然，實驗中出現的有關幾何學的問題也應該是什麼都不知道。這正是蘇格拉底所說的“不知道的人”，那麼“幾何學”（對這少年來說）就是“不知道的事情”。但是，如前所述，蘇格拉底想証明的就是即使不知道事物的人，“正確臆見”也會內在其中。為了“診斷”（當然是通過“提問”進行的）是否懷有這個“正確臆見”（靈魂的嬰兒），“接生婆”是必要的。但是“接生婆”不僅僅只診斷是否“懷孕”，還要通過“助產”（不言而喻就是“提問”）讓這少年生出“靈魂的嬰兒”，使這嬰兒顯露於陽光之下。因此，在《美諾篇》中的“回憶說”特別強調“提問”的作用，其原因就在於此?決不是僅僅只是為了強調作為他者存在的“提問”問題。   在提問引導之下，使內在的“正確臆見”重新得到把握的回憶，只表現了被提問情況下的回憶。而對於在“被提問”這一外部要素不存在的時候，是否可以回憶的問題《美諾篇》中沒有任何的涉及。那麼，這就明顯留下了：如果可以回憶的話，那麼在什麼樣的情況下是可能的，這一問題還沒有被提出來探討。   綜上所述，柏拉圖在《美諾篇》中，通過“回憶的實驗”証明了人的學習掌握知識並不是由他人所教的，而是自己的回憶。自己之所以能夠回憶，是因為作為人無論是誰，關於所有事情的“正確臆見”都是內在的。就連出生之后沒有受過任何教育的少年（奴隸）都會擁有“正確臆見”，那麼其他人就不可能會沒有的。   更進一步來說，人不僅“正確臆見”是內在的，而且“無論是誰”都能夠回憶。當然，為了自己再次掌握那種“正確臆見”，有時根據人或事情的不同需要外在力量的幫助。但是，無論借助什麼樣的手段，回憶始終是回憶者自身，他人並不能代替自己回憶。這就是《美諾篇》中“回憶說”的基本特點和性質，也可以說是柏拉圖哲學認識論的基礎。   但是，“回憶說”作為柏拉圖哲學中重要的學說，在《美諾篇》中的論証還不夠完善。關於靈魂不死的邏輯論証明，以及揭示能夠引起回憶的所有的情形等問題，在此都尚未得以完成。   換一種說法，《美諾篇》中討論的“回憶說”給人的印象是，它就像一個演員登上哲學的舞台，只是說了個開場白，表演了“能否探索不知道的事物”這一命題証明的一幕就匆匆退往幕后不見了。如何把自己的存在上升到作為戲劇的主角地位，表演出更為豐富而完整的內容，在這個對話篇中卻沒有給予充分的台詞。那麼，完成這一演出任務的，只有等待著在《斐多篇》裡這一主角的豐滿登場了。

注釋： ①《美諾篇》72c。 ②除了《美諾篇》之外，比如說《拉凱斯篇》、《卡爾米德斯篇》、《歐緒弗羅篇》等，蘇格拉底對於思慮、勇敢、虔敬等問題的追問，都與這裡所討論的關於德性問題一樣，要求對於諸多現象形態背后的所共有的本質之一者的把握。 ③《泰亞泰德篇》149a-151d，蘇格拉底把自己的問答法比喻成“接生術”。具體內容清參照該對話篇。 ④請參照《泰亞泰德篇》161a、《會飲篇》175d，etc。 ⑤《美諾篇》85d。 ⑥《美諾篇》85c。 ⑦《斐多篇》73a。 ⑧《美諾篇》（97a-b）中，對於“知識”與“正確臆見”的區別，蘇格拉底以“通向拉裡薩的道路”來比喻兩者的不同。在知道路該怎麼走的人引導下到達目的地，和不知道路該怎麼走，只是靠邊猜測邊走，偶爾也正確地到達目的地。這兩者之不同，正是“知識”與“正確臆見”之不同。在別的對話篇還有以盲人走路來比喻說明兩種認識狀態的不同。 ⑨《斐多篇》76b中談到的人對於自己知道的事情可以“賦予邏格斯（echein didonai logon）”之“邏格斯”就擁有這種意義。 ⑩參照《美諾篇》85c。 (11)《斐多篇》73a，《美諾篇》85c。 (12)《斐多篇》73c。 (13)在《斐德羅篇》中，柏拉圖描述靈魂觀照本真世界時還談到，其實有的靈魂連一眼也沒有看到本真（真理）的原野時就在擁擠的過程中由於折斷了翅膀下墜進入輪回。不過，這種靈魂一定不會是人的靈魂。雖然柏拉圖在這裡沒有直接談及此事。我們可以從他的其他論述中獲得這種答案。比如在249b-c的一段敘述中提到，人的靈魂曾經與神一起觀看本真世界時已經見到過“形相（eidos）”。我們理性的作用就是通過思考回憶起那種存在。試想一下，如果人的靈魂連一眼都沒有看過“真理的原野”，那麼，其就不可能擁有內在之”正確臆見”，回憶是不可能的。只要柏拉圖承認無論是誰都擁有回憶的能力，那麼，那種一眼也沒有觀看過本真世界就下墜的靈魂不可能是人的靈魂。人的靈魂肯定是觀看過本真世界的靈魂，哪怕只有一眼。 (14)詳細內容請參照《斐德羅篇》246a-249d。 (15)《美諾篇》86b。 (16)請參照《美諾篇》82b以下內容。 (17)《斐多篇》70a。 (18)在《斐多篇》86b中，克貝斯以織布師比喻靈魂，以布（衣服）比作肉體。靈魂與肉體的關系，猶如織布師與衣服的關系。織布師一生織了很多衣服，那些衣服一件一件都穿壞腐爛消失了而織布師還活著。可是，由於長年勞作，織布師慢慢年邁衰老，在他織完最后一件衣服時，那件衣服還沒有腐爛消失而織布師卻已經死去了。也就是說，靈魂在經歷無數次輪回后其純粹性不斷減弱，也許會在離開最后一次輪回的肉體時，在肉體還沒有腐爛時就煙霧般消失。也就是說，即使比肉體先在並且長壽，但是最終也會死去消亡的。 (19)《美諾篇》81a。 (20)馬克?L?馬可菲冉《蘇格拉底的宗教》PP.305-307。 (21)康福德《從宗教到哲學---歐洲思維的起源》PP.288-289。 (22)與靈魂問題相關的ieda、eidoa、ousia的存在問題也同樣，初期對話篇中只是作為事物內部的本質性存在來認識，並沒有像中期那樣，完全作為獨立於事物的離在性存在進行把握。關於這個問題的具體論述，請參照羅斯的《柏拉圖的相論》。 (23)請參照《美諾篇》81c。 (24)《美諾篇》85c。   【參考文獻】 [1]Platonis opera(oxford classical texts) [2]プラトン《プラトン全集》岩波書店，1976年 [3]F.M.Conford,From Religion to Philosophy—A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation,Cambridge,1972。 [4]マーク?L?マックフェラン《ソクラテスの宗教》法政大學出版局、2006年 [5]W.D.Roos,Plato’s Theory of Ideas, 2nd ed.Oxford,The Clarendon Press,1953。

 

 

 

Meno By Plato Written 380 B.C.E Translated by Benjamin Jowett -- http：//classics.mit.edu/Plato/Meno.html   Persons of the Dialogue MENO。SOCRATES。A SLAVE OF MENO。ANYTUS     Meno：Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?   Socrates：O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you.   I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say："Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not."   And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the "quid" of anything how can I know the "quale"? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?   Men：No, Indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?   Soc：Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.   Men：Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens? Soc：Yes, I have.   Men：And did you not think that he knew? Soc：I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said：please, therefore, to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that you and he think much alike. Men：Very true.   Soc：Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me：By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.   Men：There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the virtue of a man-he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described：her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue：there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates.   Soc：How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply：But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me? Men：I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.   Soc：And if I went on to say：That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike;-would you be able to answer? Men：I should.   Soc：And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, "What is virtue?" would do well to have his eye fixed：Do you understand? Men：I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish.   Soc：When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? Men：I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.   Soc：And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference? Men：I think not.   Soc：And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? Men：I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others.   Soc：But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? Men：I did say so.   Soc：And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice? Men：Certainly not.   Soc：Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice? Men：Certainly.   Soc：Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? Men：True.   Soc：And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust? Men：They cannot.   Soc：They must be temperate and just? Men：Yes.   Soc：Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in the same virtues? Men：Such is the inference.   Soc：And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same? Men：They would not.   Soc：Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.   Men：Will you have one definition of them all? Soc：That is what I am seeking.   Men：If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.   Soc：And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave? Men：I think not, Socrates. Soc：No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is "the power of governing"; but do you not add "justly and not unjustly"? Men：Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.   Soc：Would you say "virtue," Meno, or "a virtue"? Men：What do you mean? Soc：I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is "a figure" and not simply "figure," and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there are other figures. Men：Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue-that there are other virtues as well as justice. Soc：What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me.   Men：Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and there are many others. Soc：Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case：in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all.   Men：Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things. Soc：No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before：Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered "roundness," he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is "figure" or "a figure"; and you would answer "a figure." Men：Certainly. Soc：And for this reason-that there are other figures? Men：Yes.   Soc：And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you would have told him. Men：I should.   Soc：And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other colours as well. Men：I should.   Soc：And if he had said, Tell me what they are?-you would have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness. Men：Yes.   Soc：And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say：Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure-which contains straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other-that would be your mode of speaking? Men：Yes.   Soc：And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round? Men：Certainly not.   Soc：You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round? Men：Very true.   Soc：To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say：Do you not understand that I am looking for the "simile in multis"? And then he might put the question in another form：Mono, he might say, what is that "simile in multis" which you call figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.   Men：I would rather that you should answer, Socrates. Soc：Shall I indulge you? Men：By all means. Soc：And then you will tell me about virtue? Men：I will. Soc：Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won. Men：Certainly.   Soc：Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you say to this answer?-Figure is the only thing which always follows colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?   Men：But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer. Soc：Why simple? Men：Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows colour. (Soc：Granted.) Men：But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is-what sort of answer would you have given him?   Soc：I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him：You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity?-all which words use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions about them：but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated-that is all which I am saying-not anything very difficult.   Men：Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.   Soc：And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry. Men：Yes. Soc：Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid.   Men：And now, Socrates, what is colour? Soc：You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what is Gorgias' definition of virtue.   Men：When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.   Soc：A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers. Men：Why do you think so? Soc：Why, because you always speak in imperatives：like all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore to humour you I must answer. Men：Please do. Soc：Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you? Men：I should like nothing better.   Soc：Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence? Men：Certainly. Soc：And passages into which and through which the effluences pass? Men：Exactly.   Soc：And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large? Men：True. Soc：And there is such a thing as sight? Men：Yes.   Soc：And now, as Pindar says, "read my meaning" colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense. Men：That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.   Soc：Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in the habit of hearing：and your wit will have discovered, I suspect, that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many other similar phenomena. Men：Quite true.   Soc：The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure. Men：Yes.   Soc：And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.   Men：But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.   Soc：Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good：and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces：I have given you the pattern.   Men：Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says, and I say too- Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining them.   Soc：And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good? Men：Certainly.   Soc：Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good? Men：I think not. Soc：There are some who desire evil? Men：Yes.   Soc：Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them? Men：Both, I think.   Soc：And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding? Men：Certainly I do.   Soc：And desire is of possession? Men：Yes, of possession.   Soc：And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm? Men：There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.   Soc：And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils? Men：Certainly not.   Soc：Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be good they really desire goods? Men：Yes, in that case.   Soc：Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them? Men：They must know it.   Soc：And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them? Men：How can it be otherwise? Soc：But are not the miserable ill-fated? Men：Yes, indeed.   Soc：And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated? Men：I should say not, Socrates.   Soc：But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?   Men：That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.   Soc：And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good? Men：Yes, I did say so.   Soc：But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect? Men：True. Soc：And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it? Men：Exactly.   Soc：Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?   Men：I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view this matter.   Soc：Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may be right：-You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods?   Men：Yes.   Soc：And the goods which mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the state-those are what you would call goods?   Men：Yes, I should include all those.   Soc：Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?   Men：Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.   Soc：Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.   Men：Why, how can there be virtue without these?   Soc：And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally virtue?   Men：True.   Soc：Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.   Men：It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.   Soc：And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?   Men：Yes.   Soc：And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.   Men：Why do you say that, Socrates?   Soc：Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.   Men：Yes.   Soc：Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said by you to be parts of virtue.   Men：What of that?   Soc：What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question：What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?   Men：No; I do not say that he can.   Soc：Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?   Men：Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.   Soc：But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have to ask over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?   Men：I believe that you are.   Soc：Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?   Men：O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons-and very good ones they were, as I thought-at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that. you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.   Soc：You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.   Men：What do you mean, Socrates? Soc：I can tell why you made a simile about me. Men：Why? Soc：In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about them - as well they may - but I shall not return the compliment. As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before you touched me. However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry.   Men：And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know?   Soc：I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the, very subject about which he is to enquire.   Men：Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?   Soc：I think not.   Men：Why not? Soc：I will tell you why：I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that-   Men：What did they say? Soc：They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.   Men：What was it? and who were they? Soc：Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how they might be able to give a reason of their profession：there, have been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar, and many others who were inspired. And they say-mark, now, and see whether their words are true - they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. "For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages."           The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, rand having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out of a single recollection -all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection.        And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry：for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.   Men：Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you teach me how this is?   Soc：I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve me in a contradiction.   Men：Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say is true, I wish that you would.   Soc：It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.     【童奴實驗】   Men：Certainly. Come hither, boy. Soc：He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not? Men：Yes, indeed; he was born in the house. Soc：Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether he learns of me or only remembers. Men：I will.   Soc：Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square? Boy：I do. Soc：And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal? Boy：Certainly. Soc：And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal? Boy：Yes. Soc：A square may be of any size? Boy：Certainly.   Soc：And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain：if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once? Boy：Yes.   Soc：But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet? Boy：There are. Soc：Then the square is of twice two feet? Boy：Yes. Soc：And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me. Boy：Four, Socrates.   Soc：And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal? Boy：Yes. Soc：And of how many feet will that be? Boy：Of eight feet.   Soc：And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the side of that double square：this is two feet-what will that be? Boy：Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.   Soc：Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does he not? Men：Yes. Soc：And does he really know? Men：Certainly not. Soc：He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is double. Men：True.   Soc：Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To the Boy.) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a figure equal every way, and twice the size of this-that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from double line? Boy：Yes. Soc：But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here? Boy：Certainly.   Soc：And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet? Boy：Yes. Soc：Let us describe such a figure：Would you not say that this is the figure of eight feet? Boy：Yes.   Soc：And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet? Boy：True. Soc：And is not that four times four? Boy：Certainly.   Soc：And four times is not double? Boy：No, indeed. Soc：But how much? Boy：Four times as much.   Soc：Therefore the double line, boy, has given a space, not twice, but four times as much. Boy：True. Soc：Four times four are sixteen-are they not? Boy：Yes. Soc：What line would give you a space of right feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;-do you see? Boy：Yes. Soc：And the space of four feet is made from this half line? Boy：Yes.   Soc：Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other? Boy：Certainly. Soc：Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one? Boy：Yes; I think so. Soc：Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four? Boy：Yes.   Soc：Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet? Boy：It ought. Soc：Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be. Boy：Three feet.   Soc：Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one：and that makes the figure of which you speak? Boy：Yes.   Soc：But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet? Boy：That is evident. Soc：And how much are three times three feet? Boy：Nine. Soc：And how much is the double of four? Boy：Eight. Soc：Then the figure of eight is not made out of a of three? Boy：No.   Soc：But from what line?-tell me exactly; and if you would rather not reckon, try and show me the line. Boy：Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.   Soc：Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet：but then he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows. Men：True.   Soc：Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance? Men：I think that he is.   Soc：If we have made him doubt, and given him the "torpedo's shock," have we done him any harm? Men：I think not.   Soc：We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world again and again that the double space should have a double side. Men：True.   Soc：But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or learned what he fancied that he knew, though he was really ignorant of it, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and had desired to know? Men：I think not, Socrates.   Soc：Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch? Men：I think so.   Soc：Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me：and do you watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn? Boy：Yes. Soc：And now I add another square equal to the former one? Boy：Yes. Soc：And a third, which is equal to either of them? Boy：Yes.   Soc：Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner? Boy：Very good. Soc：Here, then, there are four equal spaces? Boy：Yes. Soc：And how many times larger is this space than this other? Boy：Four times.   Soc：But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember. Boy：True. Soc：And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, bisect each of these spaces? Boy：Yes. Soc：And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space? Boy：There are.   Soc：Look and see how much this space is. Boy：I do not understand.   Soc：Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces? Boy：Yes. Soc：And how many spaces are there in this section? Boy：Four. Soc：And how many in this? Boy：Two. Soc：And four is how many times two? Boy：Twice. Soc：And this space is of how many feet? Boy：Of eight feet. Soc：And from what line do you get this figure? Boy：From this.   Soc：That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner of the figure of four feet? Boy：Yes.   Soc：And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal? Boy：Certainly, Socrates.     Soc：What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given out of his own head? Men：Yes, they were all his own. Soc：And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know? Men：True. Soc：But still he had in him those notions of his-had he not? Men：Yes. Soc：Then he who does not know may still have true notions of that which he does not know? Men：He has. Soc：And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in different forms, he would know as well as any one at last? Men：I dare say.   Soc：Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions? Men：Yes. Soc：And this spontaneous recovery of knowledge in him is recollection? Men：True.   Soc：And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed? Men：Yes.   Soc：But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house. Men：And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.   Soc：And yet he has the knowledge? Men：The fact, Socrates, is undeniable.   Soc：But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other time? Men：Clearly he must.   Soc：Which must have been the time when he was not a man? Men：Yes.   Soc：And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man? Men：Obviously.   Soc：And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember. Men：I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.   Soc：And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know; - that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.   Men：There again, Socrates, your words seem to me excellent. Soc：Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together into the nature of virtue?   Men：By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in some other way?   Soc：Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained "what it is." But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,-such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question "Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way," to be argued upon hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle, will reply："I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion：If the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it, the given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced, then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle"：-that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and -qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or not taught, under a hypothesis：as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be-that virtue is or is not knowledge,-in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, remembered"? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not everyone see that knowledge alone is taught? Men：I agree.   Soc：Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught? Men：Certainly.   Soc：Then now we have made a quick end of this question：if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not? Men：Certainly.   Soc：The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species? Men：Yes, that appears to be the -question which comes next in order.   Soc：Do we not say that virtue is a good?-This is a hypothesis which is not set aside. Men：Certainly.   Soc：Now, if there be any sort-of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in think in that virtue is knowledge? Men：True. Soc：And virtue makes us good? Men：Yes. Soc：And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable? Men：Yes. Soc：Then virtue is profitable? Men：That is the only inference.   Soc：Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth-these, and the like of these, we call profitable? Men：True. Soc：And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm：would you not think so? Men：Yes. Soc：And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used? Men：Certainly.   Soc：Next, let us consider the goods of the soul：they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like? Men：Surely.   Soc：And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited? Men：True.   Soc：And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful? Men：Very true.   Soc：And in general, all that the attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite? Men：That appears to be true.   Soc：If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence? Men：I quite agree.     〈書童：真如本身，無益亦無害於自身。       然而，真如顯現的智慧與無明，看似有益或有害於人。〉   Soc：And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly? Men：True. Soc：And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly. Men：Yes. Soc：And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits-and virtue, as we say, is profitable? Men：Certainly. Soc：And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom? Men：I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.   Soc：But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good? Men：I think not. Soc：If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men; and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them; and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state? Men：Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.   Soc：But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction?   Men：There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught.   Soc：Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous? Men：I certainly thought just now that we were right. Soc：Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now, but always. Men：Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?   Soc：I will try and tell you why, Meno：I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge：for consider now. and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples? Men：Surely.   Soc：And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught? Men：True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?   Soc：I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the most likely to know. Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we should make enquiry; to him then let us repair. In the first Place, he is the son of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and who is a well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or over-bearing, or annoying; moreover, this son of his has received a good education, as the Athenian people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the teachers? Consider the matter thus：If we wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians? Any：Certainly.   Soc：Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers? Any：Yes. Soc：And so forth? Any：Yes.   Soc：Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who will come and learn? And if these were our reasons, should we not be right in sending him? Any：Yes.   Soc：And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the other arts? Would a man who wanted to make another a flute-player refuse to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be plaguing other persons to give him instruction, who are not professed teachers and who never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge which he wishes him to acquire-would not such conduct be the height of folly? Any：Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.   Soc：Very good. And now you are in a position to advise with me about my friend Meno：He has been telling me, Anytus, that he desires to attain that kind of wisdom and-virtue by which men order the state or the house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument imply clearly that we should send him to those who profess and avouch that they are the common teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price?   Any：Whom do you mean, Socrates? Soc：You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists?   Any：By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influences to those who have to do with them.   Soc：What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not only do them no good, but positively corrupt those who are entrusted to them, and in return for this disservice have the face to demand money? Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas during more than forty years, Protagoras was corrupting all Hellas, and sending his disciples from him worse than he received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not mistaken,-he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a good reputation, which to this day he retains：and not only Protagoras, but many others are well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them consciously or unconsciously? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?   Any：Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their money to them, were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians who entrusted their youth to the care of these men were still more out of their minds, and most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and did not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike.   Soc：Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so angry with them?   Any：No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them.   Soc：Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?   Any：And I have no wish to be acquainted.   Soc：Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?   Any：Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of men these are, whether I am acquainted with them or not.   Soc：You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to become eminent in the virtues which I was just, now describing. He is the friend of your family, and you will oblige him.   Any：Why do you not tell him yourself?   Soc：I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name? Any：Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at random, if he will mind him, will do far more, good to him than the Sophists.   Soc：And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that which they had never learned themselves?   Any：I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of gentleMen：Have there not been many good men in this city?   Soc：Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;-not whether there are, or have been, good men in this part of the world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men our own and of other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way：Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?   Any：Certainly; no man better.   Soc：And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?   Any：Yes certainly,-if he wanted to be so.   Soc：But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on horseback and hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvellous things; and in anything which could be learned from a master he was well trained? Have you not heard from our elders of him? Any：I have.   Soc：Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity? Any：Very likely not.   Soc：But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father was?   Any：I have certainly never heard any one say so.   Soc：And if virtue could have been taught, would his father Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled? Any：Indeed, indeed, I think not.   Soc：Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be among the best men of the past. Let us take another,-Aristides, the son of Lysimachus：would you not acknowledge that he was a good man? Any：To be sure I should.   Soc：And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus. Any：I know.   Soc：And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics and all sorts of arts-in these respects they were on a level with the best-and had he no wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue, as I suspect, could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians and few in number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a good education in other things, he trained in wrestling, and they were the best wrestlers in Athens：one of them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do you remember them? Any：I have heard of them.   Soc：Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose children were taught things for which he had to spend money, would have taught them to be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have been taught, he would have found out some Athenian or foreigner who would have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?   Any：Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of Men. and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that you know.   Soc：O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?   Men：Certainly there are.   Soc：And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?   Men：No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse.   Soc：Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?   Men：I think not, Socrates.   Soc：And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?   Men：I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue：and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; but he thinks that men should be taught to speak.   Soc：Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?   Men：I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.   Soc：And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says the very same thing?   Men：Where does he say so?   Soc：In these elegiac verses：Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have. Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?   Men：Clearly.   Soc：But in some other verses he shifts about and says：If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they [who were able to perform this feat] would have obtained great rewards. And again：- Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a bad man into a good one. And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.   Men：Clearly.   Soc：And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is there anything about which even the acknowledged "gentlemen" are sometimes saying that "this thing can be taught," and sometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion?   Men：I should say, certainly not.   Soc：But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers? Men：No.   Soc：And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples? Men：Agreed.   Soc：And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples? Men：We have.   Soc：And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere? Men：There are not.   Soc：And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars? Men：That, I think, is true.   Soc：Then virtue cannot be taught? Men：Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no good Men. And if there are, how did they come into existence?   Soc：I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge (episteme);-and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all.   Men：How do you mean, Socrates? Soc：I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so. Men：Yes.   Soc：And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action-there we were also right? Men：Yes.   Soc：But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong.   Men：What do you mean by the word "right"? Soc：I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide? Men：Certainly.   Soc：And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not? Men：Certainly.   Soc：And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth? Men：Exactly.   Soc：Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion. Men：True.   Soc：Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge? Men：The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.   Soc：What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion? Men：I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion-or why they should ever differ.   Soc：And shall I explain this wonder to you? Men：Do tell me.   Soc：You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus; but perhaps you have not got them in your country?   Men：What have they to do with the question? Soc：Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.   Men：Well. what of that? Soc：I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions： while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.   Men：What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.   Soc：I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.   Men：Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.   Soc：And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge? Men：There again, Socrates, I think you are right.   Soc：Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge? Men：True.   Soc：And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful? Men：Yes.   Soc：Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him-(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature? Men：Not I.)   Soc：Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good? Men：Certainly not.   Soc：And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching? Men：Yes.   Soc：If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge], then, as we thought, it was taught? Men：Yes.   Soc：And if it was taught it was wisdom? Men：Certainly.   Soc：And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not? Men：True.   Soc：But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue? Men：Yes.   Soc：Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom? Men：Certainly.   Soc：And yet we admitted that it was a good?   Men：Yes. Soc：And the right guide is useful and good? Men：Certainly.   Soc：And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion-these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man：but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge. Men：I think so too.   Soc：But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge. Men：Clearly not.   Soc：Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life. Men：I think not.   Soc：And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves-because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge. Men：That is probably true, Socrates.   Soc：But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say. Men：So I believe.   Soc：And may we not, Meno, truly call those men "divine" who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word? Men：Certainly.   Soc：Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing what they say. Men：Yes.   Soc：And the women too, Meno, call good men divine-do they not? and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say "that he is a divine man."   Men：And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.   Soc：I da not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry-the result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen some one who is capable of educating states Men. And if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead, "he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting shades"; and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among shadows. Men：That is excellent, Socrates.   Soc：Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good service to the Athenian people.   THE END